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ABSTRACT 
Regulation-by-demand, a new ins titutional design for the 
monopo ly problem, is based on the demanders' participatJon 
the industry' s regulatory process. Conventional rate of return 
in 
regulation fails to implement al locative efficiency, and is subject to 
significant limitations and distortions in its information proces s ing 
which prevent s  the preferences from being disclo sed . It is sugJested 
h ·f ·1· f · h · h · · t at L a utL Lty unctLon t at encompasses qualLty c aracterLStLcs LS 
considered, the failures in the industry's performance are even lmore 
severe than what is usually acknowledged. Regulation-by-demand 
provides allocatively functional incentives for reliable information 
processing and for efficient performance of the industry. It hds 
· ·f· d f · · · 1 fl ·b·1· · f  h · d sLgnL LCant a vantages o LnstLtutLona exL L Lty L t e Ln u�try 
looses its natural monopoly properties. 
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REGULATION BY DEMAND:  
A NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE NATURAL MONOPOLY PROBLEM* 
Jorn Kruse 
INTRODUCTION 
Criticism on the effects and failure of rate of return 
regulation is numerous. It i s ,  therefore , surprising that the 
literature is very scarce with respect to new institutional designs to 
avoid these failures. The only fundamentally new approach, so far , 
for an institutional redesign of natural monopoly industries is the 
franchise bidding concept ,  with some varieties.1 
The main feature of the franchise bidding proposal is the 
preservation or restoration of invisible hand forces during the pre-
contract process. After a competitive bidding among possible 
suppliers , the demanders grant a "right to serve" to one of them , who 
promises to be the best choice for guaranteeing them a "right to be 
served" for reasonable prices and performance. 
Wil liamson2 provides a detailed critical review of three 
varieties of the franchise bidding propo sal,  applying the contractual 
relations framework3 to the stipulations and contracting in a 
franchise bidding sys tem. He convincing ly suggests that the bounded 
rationality that the parties are subject to,  prevents them from 
* Research and publication of this paper is sponsored in part by
the American Council of Learned Societies. 
reaching al locatively efficient contracts because of the involved 
· · Th b · · h h · d · f . I · ·b1 contingencies. e asic reason is t at t e intro uction o invisi e 
1 · dm. · b·1· f I . · hand forces consequent y requires the a issi i ity o opportunistic
behavior of the parties once contingencies occur during the tile the
serving contract covers. In order to deal with contingencies lnd
opportunistic behavior , the parties have to consider in advancl which
would be the appropriate complexity of the contract and the lelgth of
time to cover. 
Short-term contracts with frequent renegotiation4 result in 
severe problems of idio syncrasies5 of the invested capital and l of the 
labor and management of the incumbent f irm. These idiosyncrasies 
restrict the demanders' option of changing their supplying 
contractors , which signif icantly weakens the invisible hand forces. 
h ff · · · b d f h · Furt er ine iciencies can e expecte rom t e resulting incentive 
. . h . . I structure of the supplying firm w ich is interested only in short-run 
returns. 
Simple long-term contracts leave the risks of the occurring I 
contingencies to the parties. This has not only distributional I 
implications ,  but also adverse al locative implications. Long-term 
contracts with increased complexity are characterized by increlsed
future contingencies covered , and entail increasingly detailed 
stipulations for specific contingencies. The 
contracts require a great deal of information 
negotiations of such 
. d . I proces sing an incur
· b1 · the po ssi e accruing high transaction co sts , which may even exceed 
advantages of the contract it self. 
2 
The transaction co st problems prevent workability of franchise 
bidding systems for most of the natural monopoly industries, with the 
pos sible exception of those where low idiosyncrasies make frequent 
short-term contracting feasible.6 
As the Wil liamson analysis is so striking, the franchise 
bidding design need not be discussed any further in this paper . 
However, it shall be noted that his criticism refers to the same 
conceptual framework as this paper does . "Bounded rationality" and 
"transaction costs" are based on limitations and costs of the 
participants' information proces sing, which is the central concept in 
the fol lowing pages. 
It is general ly as sumed in the economic discussion of natural 
monopolies that the demand side has some sort of organization ( either 
cartel like or by political representation) that enables it to act as 
one party in the negotiation process or in post-contractual 
intervention . But the method of reaching such a one-party behavior 
that is still representative for the preferences of a number of 
demanders is far from self-evident .  
I t  entails severe problems o f  communicating and evaluating 
individual demand characteristics, their aggregation, and resolution 
3 
of conflicting situations, especially when a large number of demanders 
is involved, as is in the public utilities cases . 
As the individual demand characteristics are often not known, 
not wel l-defined, and not operational, the problem increases with 
limited information processing capacities of the demanders. The 
resulting allocative problems further increase with the extent of 
4 
heterogeneity of the demanders' preferences, and the extent of 
subadditivities in the co st functions. These problems are neglected 
in the discussion on regulation and franchise bidding . 
It is suggested here that these problems are responsible for a 
great deal of the regulatory fai lures and, more important, thatlmo st 
of the suboptimalities in the industry's performance are not disclosed I 
for the same reasons that they appear : the information processing is 
systematically dis torted. Economist-observers have no independlnt
sources of information that enables them to define optimality plr se
in order to measure the empirical performance. 
markets 
Economists do not have such a per se measure in competitive 
either, but they trust their theoretical conclusions thlt the
system will come out with optimal results, if some structural 
conditions are met . Basically the same methodology is appl ied nere : I 
we examine the structural conditions, find they are not met, and I 
predict that optimality will not be reached (or only by chance in some 
peculiar cases). 
The fol lowing two main sections of this paper focus on the 
information processing and incentive structure of institutional
designs for natural monopol ies. Section 2 applies the information 
process ing framework to the regulatory system prevail ing in the I United 
States. Section 3 proposes a new institutional design for natural 
monopolies, the regulation-by-demand concept, and suggests thatlits 
incentive and information processing properties result in 
significantly improved allocative performance. 
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND CONVENTIONAL REGULATION 
The regulatory commissions practically conf ine themselves to 
price regulation--oriented at a "far rate of return"--and market entry 
regulation, with the effects widely discussed in the regulatory 
literature. The main issues are : 
cost s lack--a company looses its incentives for co st minimizing 
production if the regulatory col!Dllission grants it a quasi-
quarantee to earn a prof it that is a f ixed share r of its invested 
capital I ;  
Averch-Johnson effect--when r exceeds comparable capital market 
return and the amount of I is the only remaining parameter for the 
owners of the f irm to increase absolute profits, they wil l  choose 
the production function with the highest requirements for capital, 
which is not said to be the co st minimizing ; 7 
wrong price structure--a company protected from competitive market 
forces has decreased incentives to set a price structure that is 
al locatively efficient ; regulatory umbrel la--the regulatory 
commissions are prone to protect the incumbent firm against market 
entry and, therefore, remove further invisible hand forces ; 
institutional inf lexibility--the commissions tend to maintain 
regulatory protection beyond the point where the constituting 
average-cost/demand properties have changed the competitive lines 
might be feasible ; and 
capture effects--the commissionaires' independence from 
al locatively founded incentive structures gives way to 
dysfunctional behavior ,  such as "close cooperation" with, and 
5 6 
"career opportunities" in, the regulated firms.8 
The qua lity aspect s which are a very important is sue in 
competitive market processes seem to be widely neglected. Although a 
management fac;ng competition has a much better informational bJsis
than a monopolist's has, they very often find themselves forced lby the 
market results to change the quality characteristics of their 
products. Do we have any evidence that the regulated firm's quality 
decisions are efficient? Are we asking questions only if we fell that
answers are available by applying our usual analytical tools, oJ are
b . h · f · 1 1 . · · h 1 . we su Ject to t e same in ormationa imitations as t e supp yi�g 
decision-makers themselves? 
In order to understand the information processing problems to 
b 1 d · · f 1 1. · e so ve in an institutional sys tem or natura monopo ies with 
. d . autonomous and selfish ecision units, we start with some general 
considerations on information processing economics. We apply a simple 
framework to competitive markets, before we analyze the conventional 
regulatory system and, f inally, the regulation-by-demand design
Although it is claimed that the theoretical framework and the vlrbal
f" I d f discussions hold for one- as well as for mul ti-product irms, an or 
homogenous as wel l  as for heterogenous demanders' preference 
functions, this introductory paper, for reasons of simplicity, 
conf ines itself in the algebraic and graphic presentation to one-
product firms ( the one product can be thought of as a whole variety of 
products with f ixed internal relations) and to preferences thatlal low 
unambiguous aggregation. 
Information Processing 
Every information processing ( intra-unit as well as inter-
unit) is cos tly, either in terms of money or in terms of personal 
efforts , stress of thinking etc , and i s ,  therefore, subject to cost-
benefit considerations of the units (demanders , management ,  regulatory 
commission, etc). Incentives to actually process information are 
given by the units perception that the benefits will exceed their 
costs and will therefore: 
- increase with the units information processing capacity9 and 
"f. . . . . 10 speci ic cognitive s tructurization , 
decrease with the complexity of the problem11 and the amount of
(especial ly irrelevant) information to be proces sed , 
increase with the relevance of the issue for the units objective 
function, and 
increase with the units' judgment , if a certain amount of 
information processing really effects his outcome. 
Besides the seemingly quantitative aspects of processing 
information , we also have to examine their incentives to process 
information truly and correctly. This shal l be referred to as the 
reliability of information proces sing . 
The mentioned information processing capacity of the unit,  
however, is also generally variable, at  least in  the longer run, 
depending on the unit's co st-benefit considerations.  The capacities 
and its flexibilities are very different among the units as the 
respective co st- and benefit-functions are. 
7 8 
On one side, management s  of corporate firms generally have a 
large flexibil ity to adjust their information processing capacibies by 
d ff· d · · · d . a equate sta ing an setting up organization patterns an equipment . 
Even in the short-run or for adhoc problems , they wil l normally be 
able to rearrange their workload in order to have more capacities for 
this particular problem. With regard to "relevance" and I 
"effectiveness " ,  we can assume that the supplying firm is able to 
d. h . . f . . . . l h a JUSt t eir in ormation processing capacities to process as muc 
information as they consider mos t  profitable -- to come up withl the 
"right" decision or the appropriate information output to otherlunit s .  
The same will b e  true for those firms o n  the demand side, wherel the 
pertinent product has significant relevance for their business 
figures . 
On the other side, if the demanders are consumers 
(households) , their information proces sing 
have a quite- different result .  Consumers, 
co st-benefit considerations 
as single unit s ,  havb very 
limited capacities , which they have to share among all the different 
is sues they have to or choose to deal with . As information pro�essing 
has significant scale economies within non-heterogenous groups of 
units , the consumers may organize to set up a common information 
processing device with sufficient capacity. Such actions on a 
voluntary basis are subject to severe organizational and free rider 
problems. Empirical evidence shows that they are not workable for 
"normal" situations , but may only have effect in extreme and one-is sue 
cases. 
9 
A System's Response to Preferences 
From the al locative viewpoint ,  the demander is supposed to 
evaluate and proces s  his preferences to the system's decision-makers 
(namely the managements of the supplying firms and , in cas e ,  the 
regulatory agencies) . 
In addition to the demanders' information processing problems 
(and in interdependence with them) , the systems performance in 
receiving and processing the demanders' signals and responding to them 
allocatively adequateiy varies widely,  which is mo stly due to 
different incentive patterns.  
These aspects are incorporated in  Figures 1 ,  2, 3 ,  and 5 to 
show different systems' responses to demanders' preferences over the 
respective information processing system. The horizontal axis is 
"Expected Al locative Value of Information" , EAVI , and is scaled in 
units of ( potential) information that is al locatively worth being 
transferred. A situation will be located more to the right on the 
EAVI-axis: 
the stronger a demander feels a need for a certain product or 
pol icy, according to his preference structure and the s tatus-
quo , and 
- the more demanders feel this kind of need . 
The vertical axis gives the system's response to these needs . 
The dotted line NN' divides the "normal" or routine cases from the 
extraordinary or extreme cases , which are characterized by a very 
strong need of many demanders and which do occur very seldom . The 
I 
level Raiin represents the thre sho ld sensib ility of the system under 
which responses are considered neglectable by the system. The line S 
0 
represents the theoretical "perfect response" in an optimal syst�m and 
is used for comparisons only. For example,  let's consider an 
arbitrary political system and let the is sue be an interest that, some 
individuals share. Assume that the information proce ssing of the 
individuals alone does not get response in the system, because their 
individual information processing and/or po litical influence are too 
small.  If the importance of the issue now is considered bigger for 
the al location, and it finally becomes an outstanding problem, t�e 
individuals may succeed in forming a workab le group to increase 
information processing and gain po litical inf luence . This is 
represented by s1 in Figure 
1 . While the is sue is in the normal
EAVI-range, the individuals anticipate the non-response , and their 
information processing will be significantly smaller than it would be 
in a responding system. This gives the framework for the 
institutional discus sion of the following pages.  
The demanders' preferences are assumed to be given by a 
utility function 
10 
.u 
J 
1 1 
_y[.k(p),.k(q ), ... ,.k(q )] J J J J 
1 c 1 ... 1 (1) 
where p is the price and the q1 are the different non-price
characteristics of the product . The . k(p) and . k ( q
1) express the 
J J 
demander j's relative criteria of price and non-price characteri stics 
( the importance for his objective function; utility function). If we 
consider the complexity involved in the availability or non-
Response 
FIGURE 1 
Nl 
I 
I 
N 
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R . min 
EAVI 
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availab ility of certain characteristics vector s ,  it is immediately 
clear that no demander could ever process all the information 
necessary to fully represent his preferences , or even give a set of 
operational criteria that holds for more than one point. Since the 
demanders' information pro ces sing capacities are rather limited , the 
problem for the institutional sys tem comes down to asking them the 
"appropriate ques tions" in order to get the preference revealing 
information that is relevant for the supply decisions and that will be 
processed "reliably enough" by the demanders. Or : how does the 
system deal with the informational imperfections that are inevitable? 
For example, a demander might be able to give an overall preference 
order .u1 > .u2 
J J 
between two or more product s  i 
( i  = 1 ,  2 ,  • • •  ) , but is not able to identify the main criteria jk that 
actually effect this judgment .  The firs t task is  much easier t o  carry 
out than the latter is , and it reveals some information about the 
demander's criteria. Whereas,  if the demanders' task were the latter 
and a higher information proces sing level would be required in order 
to participate in the al locative "preference articulation game,''. more 
and more demanders could not participate and the results would be 
systematically distorted . The problem of incomplete preference 
articulation will be a basic one for all institutional designs for 
al location, but its degree and especially its impact on the resulting 
allocative performance will significantly vary. 
In competitive markets the demanders actual information 
processing for revealing preferences to the supply side is identical 
with the one to choose the expectedly best product among others. Even 
if the demander does not know that he is participating in allocative 
information proces sing, his choice problem provides incentives for 
reliable information output. 
The supplying firms have s trong incentives to process and to 
subs tantiate the obtained information reliably, because their future 
profits depend on an accurate perception of and adjustment to the 
demanders' preferences. This determines their interpretation of 
signals from simplified choice processes and from subsidiary sources 
( for example marketing research). Despite the wel l-known consumer 
information problems and distorting advertising, it can be expected 
that the element s  of the objective functions will be relatively wel l 
processed by the competitive system. This is indicated by Sc in
Figure 2 .  The informational threshold is low, first because of the 
described incentives,  and, second, because of the decentralized 
decision-making and the low-s cale production units. 
Information Processing and Response in Regulated Natural Monopo lies 
In regulated natural monopolies the market process does not 
provide nearly the same amount and the same quality of information as 
competition does. The demanders' choices are drastically reduced : 
- within the given technological field (which by definition has 
natural monopoly properties) to a few (or even no) varieties 
provided by the same unthreatened monopolist,  and 
- between technological fields ( intermodal competition) by 
substitutional gaps to other technologies in the judgment of 
each demander. 
13 
FIGURE 2 
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EAVI 
This is indicated in Figure 3 with the response function Sm' 
the left s lope of which is due to variety-choices , and the right one 
is due to increasing choices of substitutional modes ( other 
techno logies). 
As the market itself does not provide enough information, we 
have to look at the non-market information processing of the 
regulatory system ,  and this is going to be the crucial point . We 
s tart with the management's role and then include the regulatory 
commis sions . The management's information processing in natural 
monopoly indus tries is subject to basically the same incentive 
15 
patterns that rule their material decisions.  Since the management has 
its own (not at allocative efficiency oriented) objectives 
( profit/rate-base) and rather l imited obligations to make their 
information available to observing third parties or even regulatory 
agencies (not talking about information that might require extra 
information processing efforts) they will reveal information about 
demanders' preferences only if they fit into their pol icy. 
Furthermore, they will make information processing efforts only if 
they expect the results to serve their interests within the regulatory 
environment . The demanders anticipation of this situation of the 
protected monopoly wil l remove their incentives to voluntarily provide 
information at their own co s t ,  because they do not expect 
effectivenes s .  Therefore, the firm's large and highly specified 
information proces sing capacity is dysfunctionally monopol ized , and 
the preference transfer sys tematically distorted. 
Response 
16 
FIGURE 3 
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The regulatory authorities practically confine their 
information processing to checking informational results obtained and 
policy options submitted by the firm .  The regulatory agencies do not 
oblige a regulated firm to offer a new product or service, or apply a 
new techno logy, first , because of legal barriers and , second , because 
of their own informational limitations . They do not carry out their 
own investigations on demanders' preferences , new technological 
developments, or new possibly available product s .  We will depict this 
in Figure 4 for pos sible movements in a regulatory procedure. The 
point 0 gives the status-quo , and the axes show the benefits of a 
certain outcome of the procedure for the firm and the demanders , 
respectively . Lets consider a certain number of radii going through 
O, each determined by an angle y and a length p ,  where the Yi and pi 
are given by a random process . Lets assume that the set of resul ting 
17 
points Pi represent the outcome of available options in the regulatory
process�without any regard to whether these options and their results 
are known to any of the participants (management of the firm, 
regulatory commis sion) or not .  The area of advantageous options for 
the firm ( initially the whole area north of the horizontal axis) is 
restricted by some further considerations if the firm has to obtain 
the consent of the regulatory commission. The regulatory procedure 
incurs co sts and risks to the firm. The firms position to dominate, 
or even to monopolize, the systems information proces sing enab les it 
to either disclose the availability of a certain option to the 
commission and the public,  or to keep them undisclosed. This 
restricts the options that are discussed to the firm's advantageous 
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ones, except in simple rate cases . The firm knows which information 
the commis sion is able to get according to the commission's capacities 
and its legal restrictions ( for example revenue and cost figures) and 
which not ( for example all not realized points of hypothetical cost 
and demand functions). Therefore, the firm will only reveal options 
if they are north of a line FF' . The upward slope is given by the 
19 
following consideration : assume the firm detects an option P1 
southeast of FF' . They will expect that they can present a package of 
P1 and P2 to reach a point P3, assuming that the commission will
either not detect the separate availability of P1 and/or that, in case
they do, they will not coercively enforce P1 separately. Such a 
strategy is not promising in simple rate cases, but it is in more 
complex issues . 
A firm's given application concerning an option P5 will not
necessarily truly reveal the result s of a firm's information 
proces sing, since the co111111ission is subject to limitations in 
s creening the application. Besides lack of technological knowledge, 
this will be due to ignorance about demanders' utility functions . 
Thus, instead of P5, a point P6 may be likely to occur . 
The restricting legal framework for the commissions 
activities, and their low budgets that prevent them from establishing 
efficient information processing capacities themselves, weaken the 
commis sions position in conflicting cas es . It undermines their 
independence, and subjects them to the influences of interest groups. 
Regulatory commissions can be expected to adopt a "muddling-through­
behavior" to avoid trouble with the powerful groups involved . These 
groups are likely to be the regulated industries themselves and, in 
some cases, especially large demander s .  Consumer-demanders are no t 
likely to get effective respons e in the regulatory process, except in 
outstanding case s . 16 Thus, we propose that the demanders' response
through regulatory commis sions is represented by s1 in Figure 1 .  ( see
page 11) 
20 
A sketchy result of the information processing and response in 
a regulated industry is given in Figure 5 .  The response i s  given by 
two distinct graphs, subject to the firms expectation if the 
processing of a certain kind of demand information is or is no t 
advantageous for their objectives, following the analysis of Figure 4. 
Response function s7 : if the firm regards it as advantageous, it will
use its own information processing capacities to either directly 
implement it, or to get the commis sions approval. Response function 
s8: if the firm does not regard it as advantageous, the response is
subject to all detrimental factors discus sed in the preceding pages . 
This will widely prevent its effectivenes s  in "normal" cases, if we 
consider price adjus tments according to the rate of return formula 
quasi-automatic . 
The Allocative Results of Regulation in a Characteristics Space 
After having discus sed the information processing problems, 
the expected results shall be shown in a graphical presentation for a 
one-product output . Figure 6 encompasses two different product 
characteristics on the vertical and horizontal axis with increasing 
utility values along the axe s .  Let s assume that the other product 
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23 
characteristics are constant. The vertical axis is the characteristic 
"price" (p) (high prices p have low utility values (p): (p) =A - p 
for a constant, positive and large number A )  and the horizontal axis 
is an arbitrary relevant quality characteristic (q1). 
R is the presently effectual point for the firm's product, 
with the firm's (and commission's) assumption and/or assertion that 
the set of iso-utility lines a 1, a2, • • •  represent the prevailing 
preferences of the demanders (with U(a1) < U(a2) < • • •  ) and that 
TIR is 
the firm's pertinent iso-profit locus, given the set a. The profit is 
determined by the regulatory constraint 
TIR I · r 
and TIR is a circular graph in the p/q
1-space.
(3) 
Generally, the profit is given by the average costs c, price p 
and quantity x: 
TI x • (p - c) (4) 
The quantity x consists of the quantities .x, each demander j decides J 
to purchase, x E . x, following . J .1 
x = 0 if a U* � 
j , j 
.x > 0, if a .U* < 
J J }} 
with x monotonously non-decreasing as ( .u - . U*) increases. (.U* J J J 
gives a minimum utility for j under which he does not purchase our 
product). With the quality characteristics in our utility function 
(1) constant by assumption except one q1 , we have 
(5) 
with assumption 
1 dlk(q ) 
d1U 
.u 
J y[ .k(p), .h ·.h l J J 
1 d2k(q ) � 0, if d u 2 
� 0 for all j = 1,2, ... 
and (5), the demand function is 
1 x = 8(p,q ) 
The average costs are a function 
1 c = 1jJ (x ,q ) 
24 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
first because of the natural monopoly condition !� < O, and second, by 
the assumption that each quality of the product-incurs its own cost 
function. 
With (8), (9) and (3), (4) becomes 
1 1 1 r • I= TIR = (8(p,q )] • [p - l)J(8{p,q },q )]
With TIR constant, we have quadratic terms for p and q
1, which is a 
circular graph in the p/q1-space. 
With 
The iso-utility lines a are represented by consumer surplus 
U(a) 
"" J 
p 
1 1 p • 8(p,q )dp dq 
1 
.'!E.__ iL < 0 , 1, dp dg 
it is reasonable to confine the graphical analysis to the northeast 
section of the n-lines, the efficiency border. 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
Reconsidering our discussion on regulatory failure,  R in 
Figure 6 will not be the welfare optimal point. The co st slack 
argument suggests the production co sts are higher than neces sary. 
This means there will be a cost function w1 with lower co sts ( c' < c).
Replacing the co sts terms in ( 10) , [6(p,q1)] decreases and the
efficiency border shifts to the northeast ,  reaching a higher utility­
level. Figure 7 shows that R2 can be reached with constant q
1, and R1 
with o ther choices for both p and q1• For the effici ency border, the
same effect would occur if the Averch-Johnson type input distortion 
would be avoided. 
For a discussion of the effects of information processing 
failur e ,  let R in Figure 8 be the realized point after a regulatory 
l)(l 
procedure held for adjusting the price after changes in costs 
according to the rate of return condition. This point has been 
reached after a move from either R' or R'' , depending on the former 
co st situation. Lets consider here a price increasing application 
fol lowing increased costs (R' -+ R). Moving to R is a reasonable 
decision only if the assertion is true that the a-set actually 
represents the demanders' preferences ,  and that TIR is the f irm's
actual iso-profit locus to the a-set.  But if,  for reasons discussed 
broadly above , the preferences are better represented, lets say , by 
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the $-set instead (with U( $) = U(a1)) , Rl)(l will be suboptimal.  Figure
8 and 9 show this for two different iso-profit assumptions. In Figure 
8 ,  the n-line is the same for the a-set as well as for the $-set, with 
the optimal point R
sa
· Figure 9 encompasses the more realistic
assumption that a different preference structure ( over the different 
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curve �8. The optimal point then is R88• 
A prediction if a given situation is subject to lower quality 
or higher prices than the al locatively optimal situation, cannot be 
derived from this analysis. This depends upon the specif ic shape of 
the iso-utility lines given by the demanders' preferences. An 
analytical observer here suffers from the same informational 
l imitations of the institutional design as the regulatory commission. 
But it can be derived that the assumption the system will produce 
efficiently according to the preferences is unfounded. The system is 
insensitive to preferences and problems of product characteristics 
unless they grow to outstanding is sues. The limitations and failures· 
in information processing leave the commission with entry decision 
problems that are too big for them. They will not be able to 
reasonably predict the outcome of a certain change of the industry 
structure and performance out of their own information processing and 
founded judgment. Being dependent upon the industry's provision of 
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information, they will tend to protect the status-quo which results in 
institutional inflexibility. 
THE REGULATION BY DEMAND DESIGN 
The regulation-by-demand design approaches the specific 
informational and incentive conditions of natural monopolies directly, 
without trying to conserve institutional elements that might be 
important in competitive environments. However , in order to allow 
institutional transition between regulation and competition if the 
constituting economic conditions have changed, the "firm", as the 
productive unit with its internal organizational structure, is still 
the same. The fundamental change occurs in the firm's objective 
function and incentive structure. This is the starting point of the 
institutional analys i s ,  and determines the element s and rules within 
the design, not the other way round. For example , profit-oriented 
decision-making by private owners of the firm becomes allocatively 
obsolete as soon as the incentives for efficient decisions are removed 
and profit no longer reflects economic performance. Consequently,  
private-ownership-influence on the f irm's decision-making is excluded 
in the regulation-by-demand design. 
As wil l be outl ined in the fol lowing , decision-making and 
information processing is completely based on demanders' preferences , 
though in varying degrees of directness. Depending on the type of 
decision to be made ( strategic or routine , strongly utility-effecting 
or merely technical),  the connection between the management and the 
actual demanders is more or less direct or general. This reflects 
different time horizons as well as different needs for co stly 
information processing. 
The most general guidelines for a firm's decision-making are 
the well-known economic efficiency rules , like marginal co st pricing 
and its numerous derivatives and approximations. These rules suggest 
decisions that can be considered optimal in the general sense of the 
demanders' welfare,  even if the demanders never formally approved 
them. Unfortunately for practical purposes , thes e rules start with 
restrictive as sumptions that exc lude part of the real world problems 
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( for example quality characteri stics), and the data to f il l  these 
rules are subject to information processing of parties that may 
systematically distort them. 
Two general principles shal l be noted for the institutional 
design: 
The system shall allow and enforce the implementation of general 
efficiency rules where they are applicable.  
The assumptions and information processing neces sary to f it a 
specific situation into a general rule as well as any other 
discretionary decision shall be made with proper participation 
( direct or indirect) of all allocatively relevant objective 
functions. 
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Thus , if we establish a system of al locative rules as 
necessary conditions for decision-making , the discretionary freedom is 
restricted to the "space" between the rules . This dialectic tension 
between rules and discretionary freedom is a constituting element of 
the regulation-by-demand design . 
Overview over the Institutional Elements 
Before we describe the institutional elements and rules in 
greater detail, the main elements of the regulation-by-demand design 
shall be noted as an overview: 
the management of the f irm is as signed and controlled by a 
demand-agency. The demand-agency also makes the strategic 
decisions about the production plan and governs all  
discretionary decision-making in accordance with the demanders' 
preferences . 
the members of the demand-agency are elected in a competitive 
process by the demanders in order to reflect their preferences 
and to set an al locatively founded incentive structure for the 
agents . 
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the demand-agency es tablishes appropriate information processing 
capacities in order to achieve efficient preference transfer .  
- a specifical ly defined public authority supervises and enforces 
given quasi-constitutional rules for the institutional 
procedures as well as for general efficiency rules , and enacts 
rules in cooperation with a representative body of pertinent 
demand agencies. 
the main rules are part of the l egal framework and not to be 
changed internally. They contain criteria to determine when a 
f irm has to be released from regulation and turned "back" to 
private ownership . 
Internalization Rule and Pub lic Authority 
The utility function (1) contains the price as an independent 
variable,  but in any economy the price-co st-relation is subject to 
limitations given by the shortage of resources . The principle that 
the use of resources shall be paid for by tho se who consume them , is 
the "internalization rule,"  which is a necessary condition for 
al location . 
In a corporate environment with no externalities it means : 
- in the interfirm relation it is identical with the nonnegative 
profit condition for the firm, and 
in the intrafirm relation it postulates cost adequate pricing 
and the absence of cros s-subsidizing . 
As ambiguities occur in the application of a general 
internalization rule , heuristic sub-rules are to be developed for 
specif ic industries and situations . The main rules and necessary 
conditions with general validity for efficient production are part of 
the legal framework that embeds the regulation-by-demand system into 
the institutional environment of the society. The compliance with 
these rules is supervised by a public authority. More special rules 
are to be enacted by this authority following a formal procedure that 
incorporates the participation and competence of demand agents. This 
participation has to be on a representative basis of all demand 
regulated f irms that will be subject to such a rule.  It has to be 
public and shall include independent academic wisdom. 
The public authority audits the f irm's bookkeeping and 
f inancial position on a regular basis ( or gives the routine work to 
auditors) and supervises the management and the agents major 
decisions, if they are in accordance with the system of prevailing 
rules . 
S ince the rules are only neces sary but not sufficient 
conditions , and since they will cover only a part of the elements of 
the utility functions , a great deal of discretionary decision-making 
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is left to the demand-agency. 
The other part of the public authority' s tasks is enforcing 
the procedural rules for electing the agents, for their decision­
making within the agency, and for their information processing . 
Analogous to the efficiency rules above, these rules are partly given 
by the legal framework, and partly developed within the sys tem. The 
authority determines the electorate of demauders for the voting 
-proces s ,  sets qual ification standards for the agent--candidates ( and 
excludes them from candidacy because of their earlier severe rule 
violation) , and settles procedural conf licts within the agency or 
between agency and management . Furthermore , they may act like a court 
of appeal for overruled minority agents to increase the pressure for 
consensus within the agency. 
The pub lic authority is a quasi-judicative institution with 
limited and defined dis cretionary freedom. Most of their 
effectivenes s  wil l stem from the agents' anticipation of their rules 
enforcement . 
Public Ownership and Financing 
In an environment where the prof its do not ref lect the firms' 
performance, and private ownership does not create efficient 
incentives , the al locative reasons for the coincidence of decision­
making power with ownership become obsolete. Therefore , these are 
basical ly separated in the regulation-by-demand design . Ownership 
here is a second-rate issue because of this separation, and "public" 
ownership is chosen as the broadest and most general interpretation of 
a pub lic interest institution. In a different but similar design , the 
demanders might be thought of as the shareholders of the f irm. This 
would create some of the effects of regulation-by-demand, but would 
incur more inf lexibilities and dysfunctional effects in a dynamic 
industry when time pas ses and demand and structural conditions change. 
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The capital market is a pretty well functioning mechanism for 
al locating interes t rates and returns to different risks of 
investments. If the f irm issues bonds to f inance its investments ,  the 
capital market will determine the f irm' s virtual costs of capital over 
nominal return and quotation. As the public institution enforces the 
internalization rule , the risks of the bonds are close to zero. If 
the public authority guarantees the returns on investment ( like the 
regulatory commissions under the prevailing regulatory system 
practically do as well) the risks will be equal to zero. This will 
enable the firm to finance itself even on a hundred percent basis. 
For some of the socially most important natural monopol ies-­
the public utilities�this does no t even create extra budget problems , 
as the pol itical institutions would already assume responsibility for 
a reasonable supply of utilities. Furthermore, the public utilities 
generally exhibit low price elasticities , which al lows internal 
solutions over price increases in case the returns are endangered. 
Therefore ,  the return guarantee of the public institution incurs a 
specific problem only, if ( 1) the industry exhibits high price 
elasticities of demand and if (2) the supply is not in a general 
public interest. In such a case , the authority has two instruments to 
cover potentially remaining risks for the returns. It can add a 
quasi-insurance premium to the capital co sts according to expected 
risks , and it can determine a higher rate of depreciation for the 
firms equipment. In both ways , the nominally accounted costs per unit 
of the product will be higher , and consequently the price will be 
higher. The accruing surplus in revenues builds a reserve fund in the 
accounting. The depreciation method is especial ly apt in those cases 
where a certain investment project of the firm serves only part of the 
demanders--and only those should pay for the incurred risks over the 
product prices. And a third method is available in cases where the 
potential demanders are identifiable and their number is small. In 
order to decrease the demand risk for the firm and the public 
institution , the demanders can be asked to guarantee a,certain demand 
in advance , before a special risky investment is made. 
The Incentive Structure of the Agents and the Management 
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The demand agency is responsible for all major decisions of 
the f irm where demanders preferences are involved. Although they have 
been given rules to fol low, they can be considered the actual 
decision-makers for these major decisions. 
The agents are elected by the demanders in a competitive 
voting process. The agent's positions are wel l-paid to attract 
competent candidates. The number of votes a certain demander may cast 
is a po sitive function of the amount of pertinent products purchased 
(not regarding sales in not-monopolistic third markets). The 
necessary information about a candidate's position on central is sues 
of the firm' s policy, his professional experience and qualifications 
for the job , and , for incumbent candidates , their voting behavior in 
former agencies , is made available to every electoral demander. For 
routine elections this will be sufficient , as in election times with 
policy controversies , interested groups will provide further 
information or bring up neglected issues. 
If the electorate is heterogenous , the public authority wil l 
divide it into sub-electorates with a specified number of agents for 
each to elect. This can occur for two main reasons :  
if the information processing capacities and/or the amount of 
purchases per demander are very different ( for example private 
consumers and high-demand production plants in electric 
utilities) in order to avoid domination of the process of 
powerful groups. 
- if the utility functions are very heterogenous , especial ly if 
the firm provides different products ( for example, if a 
telecommunications network is used by telephone customers as 
well as data transmittors or television stations). 
The pub lic authority delimits the number of candidates by 
defining qualification standards. In exceptional cases , it may 
prevent a candidacy for reasons of former severe rules infringements. 
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The election procedures determine the dependence of the agents 
on the demanders and their preferences ,  and consequently determine 
their incentive structure for decision-making. This binding to 
al locative objectives al lows the system to give the agents 
discretionary freedom within the rules and within the given incentive 
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structure. 
The assignment for the management positions (as well as the 
verification of the performance) is part of the agency's job. This 
determines the managers' incentive structure, not only for material 
decisions, but also for delivering the necessary technical information 
to the agency to make them understand the availability and co sts of 
certain policy options. As they are not dependent upon profit 
oriented owners , they have no systematic incentive to distort and 
misrepresent the information. 
Information Processing and the System's Results 
In addition to information by market results and election 
results, there are other ways of getting information about demanders' 
preferences that are less formal but nevertheless reliable if the 
execution is subject to appropriate incentives. The agency's and the 
management's incentive structure for their information proces sing is 
the same as for their material decisions ,  because their performance is 
judged on the basis of the demanders' preferences. Additionally, some 
information processing to evaluate preferences is required by the 
rules and legal framework. As the demanders' capacities are considered 
low, the agency's questions have to be simple and they must not 
require informational efforts. This can be market research type 
questionnaires on a smal ler or larger sample basis about central 
issues of the production plan , or preference judgments on 
alternatively feasible product characteristics. Another important 
aspect for identifying preferences is the proper handling of 
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demanders' complaints and proposal s .  The effectiveness of such 
signals in the system determines the incentives for such an 
articula tion . 
But do the demanders represent their preferences correctly? 
In a natural monopoly a demander is locked into one supplier, who se 
dec is ions on product characteristics determine the demander' s ut ility 
function. Any misrepresentation of his preferences in information 
proces sing will therefore deteriorate his po sition. Even if there are 
no incentives for misrepresentation, incentives for participating at 
all  in pertinent information processing may be still too low in some 
cases. This could be if a large number of demanders is involved and 
the relevance for each demander is relatively small. This is 
represented by low EAVI-values in Figure 10. The occurrence of 
dissatisfaction with the f irm' s performance will result in a higher 
EAVI and create incentives for participation in information 
processing . Beyond trifle matters, the response in a regulation-by-
demand system will be relatively strong, which is indicated in SRD in 
Figure 10 . 
For the results in the simple case where the preferences of 
the demanders can be represented by one set of convex iso-utility 
l ines a1 , a2, see Figure 11 . Because of the described information
processing and incentive structure, the demanders' preferences are (at 
least in their relevant parts) known to the agents and the management. 
The management has no incentive to misrepresent the hypothetical co st 
functions for different production plans, nor has the agency to 
real ize any other point than the most efficient, i)u,· This point will
Response 
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be more efficient than RRR which is the comparable rate of return
point (U(a) < U(81) < U(82)) , because
- the cost slack will be significantly smaller, 
- there is no systematic input distortion, 
- the "profit" is equal to the actual cost of capital,  and 
- the 1T and 8-functions are more reliably "right".
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The more difficult case where the preferences are too 
heterogenous to be relevantly represented by one set of convex iso­
utility lines requires more analysis and procedural discussion than 
can be given here.  Therefore, without institutional details, the 
following description may seem somewhat speculative. But it shall be 
noted that the agencies' internal procedures under their most awkward 
preference conditions do have generally the same properties and 
problems as most of the pol itical commissions and committees, with one 
important difference : they are more c losely bound to their voters' 
preferences structures, which they know better, and which are sti l l  
simpler than those in political electorates. And , o f  course , the same 
kind of decisions would have to be made under any institutional 
design. 
The electorates and the election procedures are designed to 
have the different preference structures represented in the agency. 
The problem-solving and decision-making within the agency are subject 
to strong pressures for consensus, and involve more information 
processing the more heterogenous preference structures are :  as the 
information concerning preferences and the firm's cost functions are 
43 
available to every agent and the public authority, monopol izing the 
information processing to develop pol icy options is impossible. If a 
first approach to a certain decision problem does not come out with a 
broad consent , the group that expec�s to win the majority on this 
issue will nevertheless hesitate to use its power. They anticipate 
that the minority group will check if the solution compl ies with the 
necessary conditions. This has two effects on the discussion it self. 
Firs t ,  economic efficiency principles will be the central issue in the 
agency's discussion and the pertinent data will be searched. Second , 
the majority group will be incl ined to make concessions before they 
use their voting power to avoid delay by interference of the pub lic 
institution and to maintain readiness for consensus for the issues to 
come. 
Ins titutional Flexibi lity 
Regulatory designs are made for the special economic 
conditions of natural monopolies. These conditions are subject to 
change. The average co st curve may be due to technical changes and 
the demand curve may shif t ,  with the result that the industry looses 
its natural monopoly properties. Such an occurrence will postulate 
institutional transition back to competition. Let's consider that a 
demand-regulated f irm has lost its natural monopoly properties and 
this is expected to be permanent. The firm then is threatened by 
market entry of new competitors. New firms will anticipate that the 
demanders do no t have incentives to stick to the old firm if they 
offer competi tive products. Market entry will be more likely with 
heterogenous preferences and rapid technical progress ,  because it 
increases the new firm's chance of successfully offering qual ity­
varied products and competitive prices. The absence of a regulatory 
umbrella that prevents entry provides information about intermodal 
relations and new technological feasibilities much earlier , because 
prevail ing regulation dis courages potential entrants to disclose new 
conditions. The availability of competition ends the legitimation of 
regulation and public ownership. The demand-regulated f irm will be 
turned "back" into private ownership by sale or emis sion of stocks. 
The demand agency will be "supplanted" by a board of directors to 
control the management. In order to maintain efficient incentives 
before and continuity after the transition, the agents and demanders 
may be entitled to buy stocks for prices according to the capital 
invested ( sum of bonds and loans divided by the number of stocks). 
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The starting of such a transition back to competition is 
subject to criteria defined within the legal framework of regulation­
by-demand. It does not depend upon a dis cretionary political decision 
which is typically dominated by distributional rather than al locative 
arguments. 
The establishing of regulation-by-demand fol lows several 
steps: 
1. The public authority determines if a f irm has natural monopoly
properties and if this makes it subject to regulation,
according to given criteria.
2. It declares some major decisions ( inves tments ,  prices , 
returns) of the f irm to be subject to its approval.
3 .  Elections for the demand agency are held. The authority 
entitles them to decision competence , except on prices and 
returns . 
4 .  Bonds for f inancing and re-capitalizing are emitted . 
5 .  The old stock will b e  exchanged in return for bonds , including 
an extra-profit for o ld investments .  
6 .  The demand agency i s  given full regulation-by-demand decision 
competence . 
The reason for a prof it for old investments exceeding the bond 
return is the maintenance of incentives for the firm in the pre­
transi tion period . The returns on new investments equal the capital 
market returns for comparable inves tments , which is also the condition 
for a theoretically "fair rate of return".  
45 
FOOTNOTES 
1. H. Demsetz , "Why Regulate Utilities?" Journal of Law and 
Economics 11 (1968) : pp . 55-66 ; G. J .  Stigler , The 
Organization of Industry ( Chicago : University of Chicago
Press , 1968) ; R. A. Posner, "The Appropriate S cope of
Regulation in the Cable Television Industry" Bell Journal of
Economics 3 (1972) : pp . 98-129 . 
2 .  O .  E .  Williamson, "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopol ies -
in General and with Respect to CATV" Bell Journal of Economics 
7 (1976 ) :  pp. 73-104 . 
3 .  See for contract economics O .  E. Wil liamson, "Markets and 
Hierarchies.  Analysis and Antitrust Implications " ,  New York, 
Free Pres s ,  1975 ; V. P. Goldberg , "Regulation and Administered 
Contracts" Bell Journal of Economics 7 (1976 , No . 2) : 
pp . 426-448; B .  Klein, R. G. Crawford, and A .  A. Alchian, 
"Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents ,  and the Competitive 
Contracting Process" Journal of Law and Economics 21 (197 8 ) : 
pp . 297-326 ; O. E .  Williamson, "Transaction-Cost Economics : 
The Governance of Contractual Relations" Journal of Law and 
Economics 22 (1979 ) :  pp . 233-26 1 .  
4 .  Posner , "Appropriate Scope " ,  pp . 98-129 . Wil liamson, "Franchise 
Bidding for Natural Monopolies",  pp . 73-104 
46 
5 .  Klein, Crawford , Alchian, "Vertical Integration", pp . 297-326 ; 
Williamson, "Transaction-Cost Economics " ,  pp . 233-26 1 .  
6 .  For a more detailed discus sion, including the weaker version 
of incomplete contracting see Williamson, "Franchise Bidding 
for Natural Monopo lies " ,  pp . 73-104. 
7 .  H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint" American Economic Review 52 ( 1962): 
pp. 1052-106 7 .  
8 .  G. J .  Stig ler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation" Bell 
Journal of Economics 2 ( 1971): pp . 3-2 1 ;  R. A. Posner, 
"Theories of Economic Regulation" Bell Journal of Economics 
5 0974) : pp . 335-358 ;  S. Pel tzman, "Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation" Journal of Law and Economics 19 ( 1976): 
pp . 211-240 . 
For the po litical and institutional background of 
regulation see R. G. Noll , Reforming Regulation: An 
Evaluation of the Ash Council Proposals , Washington, D. C . , 
Brookings 197 1 ;  M. P. Fiorina and R. G. No l l ,  "Voter s ,  
Bureaucrats and Legis lators : A Rational Choice Perspective 
on the Growth of Bureaucracy" Journal of Pub lic Economics 
( 1978) . 
9 .  H. M. Schroder , M. J. Driver and S .  Streufert ,  Human 
Information Processing , New York, 1967 ; A .  Newell and 
H. A. Simon, Human Problem So lving, Englewood Cliffs , 1972 ;  
47 
W. Kirsch ,  Entscheidungsprozesse 3, Wiesbaden-Gabler : 
1970/71 ; M. J .  Driver and S .  S treufert ,  "Integrative 
Complexity : An Approach to Individuals and Groups as 
Information Processing Systems" Administrative Science Quarterly 
14 ( 1969): p .  262. 
10 . T. B. Seiler ,  Kognitive Strukturiertheit ( S tuttgart,  1973) . 
11 . S chroder, Driver, and Streufer t ,  Human Information Processing , · 
Newel l  and S imon, Human Prob lem So lving ; Kirsch ,  
Entscheidungsprozesse ; Driver and Streufert , "Integrative 
Complexity" , p. 262 . 
48 
